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ABSTRACT  
This study describes the role of organizational justice, satisfaction and the 
performance of the budget in the participatory budgeting process. Research, which 
conducted at the local government organizations, found that there are various stages 
in the process of participatory budgeting both in the executive and legislative 
perspective as well as the perspective of superiors and subordinates. The researchers 
believe that there is a relationship between organizational, procedural fairness, budget 
satisfaction, and budget performance. Using analytical methods of exploratory factor 
analysis, the results of this study found that in the budgeting process, organizational 
fairness, budget satisfaction have significantly affected the performance of the budget. 
However, organizational fairness is more emphasized on procedural and distributional 
fairness, which have significant influence. This study implies that the relationship 
between the local government budgeting process and budget performance is 
significantly influenced by the behavior of the actors involved in it. Therefore the 
local government budgeting must be mediated by society watch through public 
hearings. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Budget participation is a concept which emphasizes that in the preparation of the 
budget involves the participation of subordinates will make the execution of the 
budget more performing than when the budget drafted with conventional methods by 
creating a budget at the level of Strategic Planning and then carry out the management 
and operational levels. Preparation of the budget that includes the participation of a 
subordinate would give a better meaning for subordinates because it can perceived as 
non-intrinsic rewards and motivates them to work even harder which in turn resulted 
in higher budget performance. Some previous researchers as Brownell (1988) Chong 
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and Chong (2002) and Maiga (2005) which examines participation in the preparation 
of the budget found that there is a significant and positive relationship between 
budgetary participation and budget performance. Their research begins with the 
results of previous studies that look at that budget's participation not only generate 
budget performance, but also there are also the so-called behavioral tendencies create 
budgetary slack. 
As research from Baiman and Evan (1983) found that participation in the 
creation of significant budgetary behavior budgeted income of lower order easily 
achieved and higher expenditure to be easy to spend it. Such behavior is not in 
conflict with the prevailing system of budgeting but such behavior there is behavior 
that hides information about the real capacity of the organization that is morally not 
right. Dissatisfaction with the determination of the budget is a symptom of a budget 
where revenues are set lower so it can more easily to achieve, so that when the budget 
considers as an achievement of performance, then the unit is considered outstanding 
organization will gain rewards. Moreover, in setting the budget, the actors making up 
the budget can be set budgets higher than the actual capacity, so even this leads to the 
easy implementation of the budget. Such behavior is said to be a behavior that does 
not give incentives to spur budget performance (Merchant, 1985; Dunk, 1993; Maiga 
2005). The behavior of the actors may detriment the budget because they fail to 
optimize the organization resources, this behavior may be regarded as abuse the 
budget (Merchant, 1995). 
Research on budgetary participation also brought inconsistent results. As 
proposed by Maiga (2005) that budgetary participation has a positive and significant 
relationship to the budget gap and is a disincentive to the performance of the budget, 
so Maiga (2005) investigated the influence of moral equity as a mediator variable in 
the relationship between budgetary participation and budget performance.  The 
budget performance will be lower when the moral equity is low, while the opposite if 
the moral equity is high, then the lower budgetary slack occurs. This lower budget 
slack considered as higher budget performance. 
However, some researchers then developed the concept of morality in the 
budgeting behavior. There are researchers (Maiga, 2005; Staley, Magner and Nace, 
2007) who observed that aspect of morality can be measured by measuring about 
justice (fairness) Other studies (Staley, et al., 2007). The results of his findings 
suggest that the interaction between the budget fairness and supervisors the 
confidence level has a positive relationship, but then its influence on budgetary slack 
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is negative. This statement means that the higher the level of fairness and trust 
supervisors budget will reduce the tendency of the creation of budgetary slack and in 
turn improve the performance of the budget. 
Then Maiga (2005) is more elaborate justice or fairness into procedural justice 
(Procedural Fairness) and distributional equity (distributional Fairness) were 
investigated by Maiga (2005). Other studies have also conducted an analysis of the 
behavior of the budget is Merchant (1985), Dunk (1987) and Maiga (2007) linking 
budgetary participation and job performance (job performance). Maiga (2007) found 
that the participation of the budget through the budget of justice and job satisfaction 
positively affects job performance. 
The results of these studies provide reinforcement to the management accounting 
literature for the research proposed by Maiga (2005) observed the phenomenon of 
budgetary participation and budgetary slack in private organizations, while research 
conducted by Staley and Magner. (2007) implemented in governmental organizations. 
The study seems relevant to address the phenomenon of budgeting in government 
organizations which according to Hogye (2004) that the more the government 
organization that can claim to have the interests of the public budget. As the 
bureaucracy, political institutions and society (Hogye, 2004; Santiso, 2006; Acosta 
and Renzio, 2008). 
In line with these studies, it seems that the implementation of the budget in local 
government in Indonesia has a wide range of phenomena are quite diverse. Based on 
the World Bank report (2007) that the performance of the budget implemented in 
Indonesia, still shows a variety of budgetary slack and it affects the performance of 
the budget. Research conducted by the World Bank (2007) shows that while the 
national government tried to cover the budget deficit by increasing debt, local 
governments still have the public funds that could be used to finance other than public 
spending, and still have a positive fiscal space. The study of the Asian Development 
Bank (2006), participation is still low budget resulting in the performance of the 
budget that does not result in optimal performance. 
Based on the description above, this proposal aims to provide a theoretical 
analysis of the phenomenon of adoption of the budget on local governments in 
Indonesia. Based on the description above, this proposal aims to provide a theoretical 
analysis of the phenomenon of the budget process on local governments in Indonesia. 
Increasing concept of budget process is used to explain more about factors that 
imvolved in the process. In budget process, that occur what is called behavioral 
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factors of a human. These factors include budger fairness, satisfaction, and budget 
performance. 
 
2. RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
Agency theory explains that information asymmetry affects systematically the 
relationship between budgetary participation and desire to create budgetary slack. A 
description of the information related to the existence of information asymmetry in 
the hands of subordinates can influence the decision-making process in the 
preparation of the budget (Baiman and Evan, 1983; Penno, 1984; Coughan and 
Schmidt, 1985). When subordinates have private information that can benefit the 
organization, the boss can not verify, without the involvement of subordinates in 
decision-making budget. This involvement provides the opportunity for agents to 
reject or accept the decisions contrary to the interests of the company. When the agent 
has the incentive and the opportunity to reject (e.g., private information), there arose 
the problem of moral hazard. 
Waller (1988) suggested that the budget performance could be increased if the 
principal realized that the local information possessed by the subordinate. Therefore, 
before the budget is set, the information asymmetry should eliminate (Baiman, 1982), 
Chow (1988), Blanchard and Chow (1983) by involving subordinate in drafting the 
budget. While Waller (1988) argued that subordinates in the formation organization 
have more accurate information than their superiors about the factors that affect 
performance. Baiman and Evans (1983) suggested that companies that have a 
subordinate who has information such participation-based management control 
systems may be incorporated into the standard or budget so that it can be used in 
assessing performance. 
Unfortunately, agents can store or hide information from the principal of their 
some or all of their local information, which can lead to the creation of budget slack 
(Christiansen, 1982; Baiman and Sivaramakrisnan, 1991). Argument of the agent 
blame or hide their private information that managers plan slack in their budget to 
enable the achievement of budget targets can be achieved and increase the tendency to 
compensate for their efforts. For example, Waller (1988) argued that if subordinates 
believe their private information communication can be used on standard-setting in 
the context of assessment information, they may have an incentive to deflect their 
communication to facilitate standard setting which is more easily achieved. This 
problem, Waller (1988), emphasize that it is very prominent if the subordinate 
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planning and budget process is based on participatory budgeting. As managerial 
compensation is based on the achievement of the budget and the information 
presented by the agent is likely to be used to evaluate their performance (Christensen, 
1982; Baiman 1990), the prospect of dysfunction consequences arise from the 
presence of information asymmetry may not be simple. Young (1985) warned that the 
existence of private information relating to participation can be generated by 
subordinates tend to build superfluousness important resources into the budget or by 
deliberately reducing the capability of the organization. 
The study of this agent captures the shift behavior in response to incentives in a 
certain determination but does not provide a decisive test of self-interest model of 
simple or simple alternative utility functions. Luft (1997) questioned the general 
understanding of self-interest is a good approximation to the behavior and arguments 
that previous testing weak in distinguishing between self-interest with a model of 
ethical behavior. Thus, while studies based Agency theory giving out evidence for the 
existence of a preference for peace, but not giving out the different proofs of the 
existence of other significant preference. 
Therefore, this study suggests that if managers tend to pursue personal interests 
or the interests of the organization depends on the level of moral equity. Ethical 
concerns typically arise in situations where personal interests conflict with the moral 
obligation to others (Bowie & Duska, 1990). DeGeorge (1992) asserts that the agents 
are motivated, ethical implement effective self-control and control not influence from 
the outside, and that researchers can utilize, promote and incorporate such motivation. 
A person who fails to recognize the moral issue will fail to use moral 
decision-making schemata (Jones, 1991). Consideration of the budget slack from the 
perspective of ethical decision making, assuming that a person must be able to 
recognize that the creation of budgetary slack as a moral issue. Slack Creation may 
not be consistent with the role associated with the desired norms and virtues of 
professional managers, and the misallocation of resources that can be detrimental to 
other organizational units and investors (Merchant, 1995). Thus, the creation of 
budget slack is an ethical dilemma - a difficult situation with a moral component 
(Douglas & Wier, 2000). Opportunistic behavior, which is part of the agent, can be 
controlled in part by concerns about the agents' for their reputation or ethics (see 
Arrow, 1985, Baiman, 1990). The idea that the individual can be highly motivated to 
pursue the interests of the organization (i.e., without the prospect of interest myself) 
have shown in the literature. For example, in an experimental study, Stevens (2002) 
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examined the effects of two potential controls for opportunistic interests - the 
reputation and ethics. The results of this study provide strong evidence that the 
reputation and ethics reduce budget slack. 
While the level of slack under the payment scheme that produces higher slack 
compared with previous experimental studies, the subject is still limiting the amount 
of slack in their budgets under the maximum, and thus failed to make their payments 
This argument is consistent with the research results of Evans, Hanna, Krishnan, 
and Moser (2001) who found that the well-being can be sacrificed to generate reports 
that are honest and productive capabilities. In Evan et al. (2001), budgetary slack is 
negatively related to the measurement of the ethical responsibilities of individual 
questionnaires at the beginning of the experiment with respect to the reputation and 
ethics set out in the other questionnaires. As information asymmetry associated with 
increased productive capability expressed concern that low subordinate to the 
reputation, thereby reducing the employer's ability to monitor the slack in their 
budgets. The results of this study suggest that reputation is the mediation of social 
control while ethics is to control the opportunistic behavior of self-interest. 
In an experimental study, Douglas et.al. (2001) investigated the ethical 
considerations auditor in typical situations they face in practice. The results showed 
that the orientation of the ethics dealing with ethical considerations in a high (but not 
low) moral intensity of the situation. These results support the Jones' (1991) 
issue-contingent argument shows that the differences in the characteristics of the 
moral issue itself, moral intensity, affect individual responses to these problems. 
In these discussions, it proposes that the participatory budgeting, moral equity at 
the individual level affect efforts to create budgetary slack. To subordinate the high 
moral equity, budgetary participation, and budgetary slack may be inversely related. 
Participation in the setting of high budget, managers tend to take advantage of all 
sources of information to improve the accuracy of budget decisions (Gul, 1991). Due 
to the availability of information is enhanced through participation, participatory 
budgeting will lead to more accurate analytical and decision-making. Therefore, the 
participatory budget is high, subordinates with high moral equity will use their 
personal information to produce an accurate budget, that is, to reduce sagging and 
profitable organization. Conversely, when the low-budget participation, equity 
subordinate to the moral high ground will have little opportunity to share their 
personal information, and the boss will only have limited success in efforts to reduce 
slack. Therefore, there is little opportunity to reduce the budget gap. 
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For individuals with low moral equity, budgetary participation provides 
opportunities for subordinates to create slack. For people, the excitement between 
budgetary participation and budgetary slack is positive, i.e., with increased 
participation of the budget, an increase in the budget gap. Because subordinates have 
low moral equity, the subordinates can use participation to introduce slack and get a 
profitable future evaluation (i.e., subordinates seek to maximize their personal 
interests). 
2.1.1 Budget Participation 
Budgetary participation is a concept which emphasizes that in the 
preparation of the budget should involve subordinates (Merchant, 1995). The 
involvement of subordinates can result in better performance of the budget, 
because:  
1) The involvement of subordinates can enhance trust and responsibility in 
achieving budget targets  
2) The involvement of subordinates can create a sense of feeling appreciated 
which in turn can increase the efforts in achieving budget  
3) The involvement of subordinates can lead to improved budget performance 
 
2.2 Procedural Fairness 
Justice (fairness) is procedural fairness in allocating resources (Thibaut and Walker 
1975). As a result of procedural fairness in decision making that is used to determine 
the outcome of the procedure (Levanthal, 1980) and the attitudes and behavior of 
those involved and affected by it (Levanthal, 1980; Lind and Tyler, 1988). 
 
2.3 Distributive Fairness 
Distributive justice or fairness is a perception of fairness or justice of the results 
obtained by the employees (Cropanzano and Greenberg, 1997; and Colquitt at al, 
2001). Budget in the literature, the concept of distributive justice related to the 
discussion of justice share. An equitable distribution of the expected related to the size 
of the distribution of resources received by managers about other managers. It can 
describe the basis of distributions received by managers in the previous budget period, 
including the proportion of the increase or reduction in comparison to the total 
distribution of the company. 
 
Review of Integrative Business and Economics Research, Vol. 6, no. 1, pp.44-74, January 2017 51 
 
 
 
Copyright  2017 GMP Press and Printing (http://buscompress.com/journal-home.html) 
ISSN: 2304-1013 (Online); 2304-1269 (CDROM); 2414-6722 (Print) 
 
2.4 Interactional Fairness 
Interactional justice concerns with the quality of the treatment received from the 
decision makers, and the extent of the formal decision-making procedures are in place 
(Bies and Moag, 1986; Tyler and Bies, 1990). In this study, interactional justice 
defines as the extent to which managers feel they have been treated fairly about 
personal interactions with supervision at the stage of preparation of the budget. 
 
2.5 Budget Satisfaction 
Budget satisfaction is one of the most frequently studied attitudinal variables in 
the supervisory literature that pertains to the use of budget and performance. 
Satisfaction is a pleasurable or positive emotional state that results from the 
self-appraisal of experiences (Livingstone, Robert and Jonko, 1995). In satisfaction of 
the budget is one of the most frequent studies of behavioral variables in the literature 
concerning its use on a budget and performance. Satisfaction is a statement of 
pleasure or positive emotions resulting from the experience of personal judgment 
(Livingstone et al. 1995). Solly and Hohenshil (1986) states that "an individual's 
satisfaction is an attitude that includes their work consisting of common factors and 
global satisfaction with the same set of specific factors associated with the resources 
to strengthen the work." Loftquist and Dawis (1996) defines satisfaction as "a 
statement of pleasure resulting from the assessment of the extent to which the work 
environment meets the desires of the individual. According to Spector (1997, p2) 
"satisfaction is how people feel about their jobs and different aspects of their work. 
Conceptualization as a multidimensional construct, including satisfaction with one's 
work, supervision, coworkers, payment conditions, promotional programs, company 
policies, and job security (Churchill, Ford and Walker, 1979). In this study, the 
concept of satisfaction involves collaboration with supervision, support for 
supervision, and overall satisfaction with the budget, where the overall satisfaction 
refers to the satisfaction of the managers cumulative with the overall beginning of the 
budget process is the same as the satisfaction received from the budget formulation 
process current. 
 
2.6 Budget Performance 
According to Maiga (2007, 2005), the performance of the budget is a measure of 
the level of achievement that is considered by the manager that they have achieved the 
target set budget. Budget performance is also defined by De Castro and De Coz 
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(12002) as a result or achievement of a process of implementation of the budget in a 
given fiscal year. The results (outcomes) budget measures by assessing the quality of 
programs and activities in the budget. Both of these definitions describe not only the 
measurement of which is the achievement of budget targets financial targets, but also 
the results (outcomes) which are a measurement of programs and activities in the 
budget. 
Dalam penelitian ini pengertian kinerja anggaran adalah suatu pencapaian dari 
target anggaran dan hasil dari program dan kegiatan yang telah ditetapkan pada saat 
penetapan anggaran. 
In this research, the notion of performance budget is an achievement of budget 
targets and results of the programs and activities that have established at the time of 
budgeting. 
 
3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
This study proposed a model that links between budgetary participation and 
budget performance mediated by perceptions of procedural justice (procedural 
fairness), distributive justice (distributive fairness), justice interaction (interactional 
fairness) and satisfaction of the budget (budget satisfaction). In particular, the model 
found the fair or honest (fairness) a budget is developed, the higher the satisfaction 
with the budget, which, in turn, improve the performance of the budget manager. The 
model also sought to investigate the direct relationship between fairness with budget 
performance. 
Maiga (2005) develop a conceptual framework to examine the relationship 
between budgetary participation and budget performance in the context of the 
budgetary slack behavioral decision makers to factor in the budgeting process. He 
then explains the research on how participation can affect the reduced budget 
budgetary slack when no moderating effects of fair behavior (fairness) in moral equity 
in the relationship interactions. In these studies can be inferred that budgetary slack 
may reflect the performance of the budget, with the perception that the smaller, the 
better budgetary slack budget performance, otherwise the higher, the lower the 
budgetary slack budget performance. 
Then further research of Maiga (2007) more equity to unravel the moral factor 
justice (fairness). Justice in the preparation of the budget is covering procedural 
justice (procedural fairness), distributive justice (distributive fairness) and 
interactional justice. To implement the budget participation, all three forms of the 
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sense of justice can establish budgets satisfaction, and satisfaction of the budget, in 
turn, will improve the performance of the budget. 
The study also describes the mechanisms underlying the relationship between 
organizational justice and performance (performance) managers (Konovsky & Pugh, 
1994; Moorman et al, 1998). Likewise, studies relating to justice in have also been 
developed in managerial accounting. However, most of the research to date, only 
accounting using experimental methods in the budgetary participation (Lindquist, 
1995, Libby, 1999, 2001) or transfer pricing decisions (Kachelmeier & Towry, 2002). 
These studies support the notion that consideration of equality issues relevant to the 
design of the process being studied. Two recent exceptions are Wentzel (2002) and 
Lau and Lim (2002), which uses survey methodology in organizational settings. 
Wentzel (2002) conducted a study in a corporate environment that is streamlined and 
found that participation in the budget process is positively related to perceived 
distributive justice, which in turn is associated with a commitment to the goal. Lau 
and Lim (2002) found that procedural justice has an indirect influence on the 
performance of the budget. 
Based on the results of previous studies of this research to establish a conceptual 
framework linking between budgetary participation and budget performance through 
organizational justice (procedural fairness, distributive fairness, and interactional 
fairness) and the satisfaction that the budget can be seen in the following scheme: 
 
Conceptual Framework 
 
 
 
 
Budget  
Participation 
Budget  
Participation 
Procedural  
Fairness 
Distributional 
Fairness 
Interactional  
Fairness 
Budget 
Satisfaction 
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4. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
4.1 Budget Participation 
Research conducted in explaining about the participation of the budget has been 
done in the earlier research. Maiga (2000); Chong (2002) and others emphasize that 
the participation of the budget in perspective superiors and subordinates showed that 
when subordinate to actively participate in the budget process will obtaine better 
results that will bring the achievement of the budget will be more successful in other 
words to perform better. 
Maiga (2001) in his research found that there is a significant relationship 
between organizational fairness to budget satisfaction. 
4.2 Procedural fairness 
Some researchers such as Lindquist (1995), Libby (2001) Kachelmeier & Towry, 
2002) Wentzel (2002) and Lau and Lim (2002), explain that there is a positive and 
significant relationship between budgetary participation and budget performance 
through organizational justice. However, not all of these studies involve or discuss the 
three types of justice (procedural, distributive, and interactional) as Libby (2001) only 
discusses the overall fairness. Wentzel (2002) examined the relationship between 
participation in the performance of the budget through distributive justice. Staley and 
Magner (2007) only consider procedural and interactional justice that affect the 
performance of the budget. Furthermore, Maiga (2007) using the third variable, 
namely procedural justice, distributive justice and interactional justice as variables 
that affect the performance of the budget. 
The relationship between budgetary participation and procedural justice, starting 
from the demand to involve subordinates to participate in the preparation of the 
budget. The involvement of more people in the budgeting process can provide ample 
scope for everyone to compare between the formal procedure that is applied can not 
be considered fair for them so that their involvement can be considered insignificant. 
Therefore, the participation of the budget is the budget preparation process, in which 
participation must follow a procedural justice (Staley and Magner (2007). 
Based on the earlier research, some hypotheses developed 
H1: Budget Participation affect significantly implementation of procedural  
   Fairness 
Participation also involves distributive justice budget, as pointed out by Wentzel 
(2002) which explained that there is a positive relationship between budgetary 
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participation and budget performance through distributive justice. Illustrates that 
distributive justice in allocating the budget to programs and activities will result in the 
behavior of managers and subordinates. When actors feel that the budget in a fair 
distribution of the budget is not divided into units of work, then they can reduce their 
desire to achieve the targets in the budget. 
The argument above used as the basis of developing further hypothesis 
H2. Budget Participation significantly and positively affects distributional  
   fairness 
The relationship between budgetary participation and interactional justice has 
been described by Maiga (2007) and Staley and Magner (2007). Maiga (2007) argues 
that interactional justice indirect effect on performance through budget satisfaction 
but the budget, while the budget is the deciding creation participation interactional 
justice (Wentzel, 2002). Similarly, Staley and Magner (2007) explains that there is a 
positive, and significant relationship between interactional justice with budget 
performance through trust watchdog and Wentzel (2002) observed that budgetary 
participation participates in creating interactional justice. 
Therefore it can be formulated the third hypothesis, which states that there is 
relationship between budget participation to interactional fairness as follows: 
H3: Budget Participation has significant and positive effect on the interactional  
    Fairness 
4.3 Procedural Fairness and Budget Satisfaction 
Procedural fairness proposes that people consider the fairness of the formal 
organizational procedures that result in decisions. Procedural fairness is important to 
employees because it offers some control over the process and outcomes of decisions, 
thereby reassuring them about the likely fairness of their outcomes (Thibaut & Walker, 
1975).  
Procedural justice (procedural fairness) is a state where people work in a system 
that assumes that the procedure was decided to use was fair and honest. Justice of the 
procedure is important for employees because it offers several processes over the 
process and outcome of the decision. In the preparation of the budget, managers can 
see a fair implementation of the budget procedures through their supervisors as a 
condition necessary to the overall fairness of formal budgetary procedures. If instead, 
the supervision perform procedures in a fair budget and therefore on the conditions 
necessary to meet the overall budget for the procedure, the manager can see how the 
procedure is carried out that focuses on the fairness of the formal procedures. Thibaut 
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and Walker (1975) explains that allow individual rejection of a fair process will 
increase satisfaction. Based on this discussion, the following hypothesis can be made: 
H4: The higher the procedural fairness implemented in the perception of  
    employee, the higher the budget satisfaction perceived by the employee 
 
4.4 Distributive Fairness and Budget Satisfaction 
When employees observe that good standards are not applied consistently to all 
employees, a judgment against the distributive fairness be affected (Kumar, 1995). In 
the scenario of a limited budget, employees can know that the consistent application 
of standards can thwart the relationship between inputs leading to the outcome by 
providing a large allocation to a certain field while others lower (Sashkin and William, 
1990). This assumption is related to equity theory suggests that individuals may 
perceive that distributive fairness is the ratio between the input and output them, that 
people are going to compare the ratio of their inputs to outcomes they produce, with 
others and do judgment about the fairness of the results they earn. Therefore, it can 
hypothesize as follows: 
H5: the distributive fairness significantly affects the budget satisfaction. 
 
4.5 Interactional Fairness and Budget Satisfaction 
Interactional fairness theory holds that an individual’s reaction to an 
organization is dependent on the individual’s interpersonal treatment during the 
allocative decision process. The policy makers’ provision of adequate explanation 
for the decision, and the treatment of employees with respect when implementing 
the decision (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Moorman, 1991; Skarlicki & Folger, 
1977). 
Supervisors promote interactional fairness when they allow the employees to 
participate in setting budgetary procedural fairness. When supervisors help managers 
develop a plan to improve budget performance and communicate clearly that the 
organization is concerned for their well-being, interactional fairness is likely enhanced. 
Therefore, managers’ perceptions of interactional fairness may be associated with how 
they perceive supervisors’ evaluation of their contribution, thereby affecting 
satisfaction (Moorman, 1991). Although similar value judgments can be 
communicated through formal procedures, the quality interactions with the supervisor 
in budgetary decision-making provide compelling evidence of an individual 
manager’s worth (Klieman et al, 2000). Thus, the following hypothesis stated: 
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To improve the performance of the budget, the supervisors can promote 
interactional justice (interactional fairness). Interactional justice could begin when the 
set of participation in budget-setting equity procedure. This fairness communicated 
clearly about the desire of the organization to improve the welfare of employees 
through interactional justice. Therefore, managers' perceptions of interactional justice 
can attribute to how the employees view the supervisory assessment of the 
contribution of the employees so that they will be satisfied (Moorman, 1991). 
Walalupun justification same value can be done through a formal procedure, the 
quality of interaction with the supervisor in budgetary decision making provide a 
good value for the individual manager (Klieman et al, 2000). Thus the hypothesis can 
be made as follows: 
H6: Interactional fairness affects significantly and positively the budget  
   satisfaction for the manager 
 
4.6 The Relationship between Budget Satisfaction with Budget Performance 
Fox (1974) argues that to achieve a better performance of the budget, then the 
employee is expected to do not only what is formally only they should do, but even 
more so with a great desire to always growing. Organ (1977), and Petty, McGee, and 
Cavender (1984) also found an employee who is satisfied with the work is a 
productive employee. 
Therefore, one of the main ways to improve performance is to increase the level 
of satisfaction. However, research linking satisfaction with the performance of 
inconclusive (Brown & Peterson, 1993). For example, Judge et al. (2001) updated 
their earlier findings and noted that although the satisfaction-performance relationship 
is weak (correlation = 0, .30), it is positive and significant. Ostroff (1992) and Ostroff 
and Schmitt (1993) have found a reliable relationship between satisfaction and 
performance at the organizational level. Also, Harter et al. (1998) have linked the 
overall satisfaction for the various indicators of the performance of various business 
units. On the other hand, Iaffaldano and Muchinsky (1985) showed that satisfaction 
and performance "are only an illusion form of correlation between the two variables 
that we think should logically interconnect, but in reality it is not.”  
However, research from Iaffaldano and Muchinsky (1985) did not examine the 
relationship between satisfaction with the performance in the context of the 
preparation of the budget. Becker and Green (1962) and Otley (1978) have shown that, 
in setting the budget, where the manager sees a budget that is realistic and achievable, 
Review of Integrative Business and Economics Research, Vol. 6, no. 1, pp.44-74, January 2017 58 
 
 
 
Copyright  2017 GMP Press and Printing (http://buscompress.com/journal-home.html) 
ISSN: 2304-1013 (Online); 2304-1269 (CDROM); 2414-6722 (Print) 
 
they will be motivated to meet budget targets. Similarly, this study shows that 
managers 'satisfaction' with their budgets to make them more effort into trying to 
achieve budget targets. Therefore, the following hypotheses proposed: 
H7: Manager Budget satisfaction positively related to the budget satisfaction  
 
5. RESEARCH METHOD 
This research seeks to observe about the perception of the actors in the budget to 
budget so that the design of this study is a survey of the perceptions of the actors, 
especially the budget budgeting in government organizations, so the unit of analysis is 
a government employee who involved in the budgeting process. 
In order to obtain relevant data, questionnaires which used by earlier researcher 
like Staley and Magner. (2007), and Maiga (2007), are developed. 
 
5.1 Operational Definition and Measurement 
This study uses six constructs were measured using a Likert scale. Each construct 
described by using definitions and measurements that have been tested for validity 
and reliability by previous studies (Maiga, 2007; Staley and Magner, 2007). 
 
5.1.1 Budget Participation 
Budget participation is an activity carried out in the preparation of the 
budget in which superiors and subordinates are involved in setting targets and 
achievements (Merchant, 1995; Maiga, 2007). The involvement of subordinates 
in the participation in the achievement of set targets and how budgets can 
improve the integrity of subordinates to execute the budget and, in turn, can 
improve the performance of the budget. 
Based on the operational definition used six scale items, whereas the 
respondents used to obtain a 7-point Likert scale used in the study as (Merchant, 
1995; Maiga 2007). 
 
5.1.2 Procedural Fairness 
Procedural Fairness is a perception of a fair state of budgeting procedures, 
including consistent implementation of procedures in each area of responsibility, 
budget decisions are equipped with accurate information and opinions presented 
well, provisions are not contrary to expectations, and in accordance with the 
standards and ethics of offender budget. (Greenberg, 1993; Levanthal, 1980; 
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Magner and Johnson, 1995; Maiga, 2007 and Stanley and Magner, 2007). Based 
on the understanding of the perception of procedural fairness measurement using 
a 5-item scale and for respondents used a Likert scale of 7 points. 
 
5.1.3 Distributional Fairness 
Distributive justice is defined as a state where everyone has the perception 
of the area of responsibility of the budget has been adequate (Wentzel, 2002 and 
Maiga, 2007). Operationalize the construct of distributive justice (distributive 
fairness) used the concept of measurement has been used by Greenberg (1993), 
Magner and Johnson, 1995; Wentzel, 2007 and Maiga, 2007). Therefore be used 
to measure distributive justice considerations about 1) the absence of overlapping 
responsibilities, 2) effective budget allocation, 3) reasonable 4) fairness in the 
determination, 5) concerns boss, 6) free from partiality, 7) the balance of 
responsibility and 8) the clarity of responsibility. By because they were, then the 
measure of distributive justice constructs used eight scale items, whereas 
respondents used a Likert scale of 7 points as used by previous researchers 
(Greenberg, 1993; Magner and Johnson, 1995; Wentzel, 2002; Maiga, 2007). 
 
5.1.4 Interactional Fairness 
Justice of interaction is a construct that describes a perception of ethics and 
justice, the interests of balance, respect and dignity, individual needs and rights 
as an employee. Measurement of interactional justice has been used by several 
researchers, including (Folger and Konovsky, 1989; Moorman, 1991; Maiga, 
2007 and Stenly and Magner (2007). Therefore, to obtain the expected response, 
it can be used a 5-item scale, while for respondents used a 7 point Likert scale, as 
has been used by previous researchers (Folger and Konovsky, 1989; Moorman, 
1991; Maiga, 2002; and Stenly and Magner, 2007). 
 
5.1.5 Budget Satisfaction 
Satisfaction budget is a construct that describes a perception of the state to 
settle in the budgeting process (Maiga, 2007). Attempts to measure the 
satisfaction of the budget can be considered attention to the budget target, a 
collaboration between the constituent budgets with a supervisor, supervisor 
support, and satisfaction of the supervisor and-budgeting (Smith et al, 1969; 
Maiga, 2007). Thus, to measure the constructs used three scale items with 
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respondents used a Likert scale of 7 points. 
 
5.1.6 Budget Performance 
Budget performance is the achievement of budget targets. Some researchers 
use scale items to measure perceptions about the achievement of the budget, such 
as Wentzel (2002) and Maiga (2007). However, in this study, the measurement 
used three scale items. Given the assessment of the government's budget 
that has been using performance budgeting concepts such as Indonesia, the 
performance of the budget is not only related to the achievement of targets in 
the commercial context but also the measurement of the attainment of the 
program and activities. Therefore used three measurements include 1) the 
achievement of budget targets in the financial context, 2) attainment of budget 
activities and 3) the gains of the program budget. Therefore used three 
measurements include 1) the achievement of budget targets in the financial 
context, 2) achievement of budget activities and 3) the gains of the program 
budget 
 
5.2 Method of Analysis 
In order to test the hypothesis as presented at the beginning of this report, the 
method of analysis used is Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) and path analysis. 
EFA is used to test the significance of each indicator used in measuring the latent 
or unobserved variable. While Path Analysis to observe the extent of the validity 
of the items used to measure the factors or dimensions. 
 
6. THE RESEARCH RESULTS 
6.1 Response Rate 
Questionnaires were collected through a meeting are more easily obtained, 
compared with a questionnaire compiled by mail. 
 
6.2 Demography of Respondents 
Respondents who filled out a questionnaire are those who work as civil 
servants involved in the preparation of the budget. In government organizations 
there are also positions that budget there called Perjabat Technical 
Implementation Activities (PPTK), there is only the regular staff, some are 
serving treasurer, treasurer and treasurer receipts, auxiliary treasurer, and some 
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areas of financial management officer (KDP) implement the accounting.  
These were the ones involved in the preparation of the budget. Budgeting 
starts with filling out a form called working unit budget form. The budget form 
which is filled by each unit then compiled into a draft budget proposed for 
discussion and approval from the legislative body. 
Although the preparation of the budget of the working unit is the responsibility 
of the Head of the unit, but the preparation and filing of the budget is not solely 
compiled and produced by the head itself, but they may involve either the regular 
staff as well as those who have position as local financial officer, and treasury. In 
this study, they were grouped into 1) regular staff, 2) supervisors and 3) manager. 
Distribution of the respondents can be seen in the following table: 
 
Tabel 1: Distribution of Respondent Based on Gender and position (%) 
 Source: data processed 
7. EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS 
Exploratory analysis begins by testing whether the sample size is adequate. The 
tests using analysis of Factor Analysis to examine KMO and Bartlet test. As can be 
seen in the following table: 
Table 2 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .752 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 1490.712 
Df 465 
Sig. .000 
Source: data processed 
The variables used were 1) Budget Participation, 2) Procedural Justice, 3) 
distributional justice, 4) Interactional Justice, 5) Satisfaction Budget and 6) 
Performance Budget. Each of these unobserved variables is measured by the number 
of different items. Latent variables measured budgetary participation with 7 items. 
While procedural justice was measured with 10 items. Distributional justice was 
Gender 
Positions  
Total 
Staff Supervisor Manager 
Male 38.24 58.54 0 45.45 
Female 61.80 41.46 100 54.55 
Total 100 100 100 100 
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measured using five items. Interactional justice was measured using five items. 
Budget Satisfaction was measured using four items, and budget performance were 
measured using six items. So the total items analyzed were 37 items. Furthermore, to 
be able to classify the whole item into six latent variables, Factor Analysis underlines 
variance that can be explained is used. Overall the item and then inserted into the 
analysis and the resulting six factors with Eigen values. 
Table 3 shows the results of calculation of the Eigenvalue of the overall 37 items. 
The highest value that can be seen on one factor Eigen is 5.247 with a variance that 
can be explained is 23.85%. The second factor is 3.085 with eigenvalues variance that 
can be explained is 14.02%. On the third factor, Eigenvalue is equal to 1,729 and 
variance that can be explained is 7.86%. The fourth factor is the Eigenvalue of 1.717 
with a variance that can be explained is 6.89%. The fifth factor has Eigenvalue of 
1.423 with a variance that can be explained is 6,47%. The sixth factor has Eigenvalue 
of 1.175 with a variance that can be explained is 5.32%. Thus by using six factors that 
total variance can be explained is 64.44% 
 
TABEL 3: Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 5.247 23.852 23.852 5.247 23.852 23.852 3.050 13.862 13.862 
2 3.085 14.023 37.875 3.085 14.023 37.875 2.849 12.949 26.812 
3 1.729 7.861 45.735 1.729 7.861 45.735 2.639 11.997 38.809 
4 1.517 6.896 52.632 1.517 6.896 52.632 2.189 9.952 48.761 
5 1.423 6.470 59.102 1.423 6.470 59.102 1.736 7.891 56.652 
6 1.175 5.342 64.444 1.175 5.342 64.444 1.714 7.793 64.444 
Source: data processed 
By using six factors, the 37 items could be divided into six factors. Meanwhile, 
to measure the internal validity can use loading factor, when loading factor is 
significant, then the internal validity achieved or invalid. 
Latent Variable procedural fairness, distributional fairness, and interactional 
justice are tested simultaneously because it is a construct which is mediating the 
relationship between participation and budget performance. 
Graph 1: Procedural, Distributional and Interactional Fairness 
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Source: data processed 
The third latent variables each have different items. Procedural fairness latent 
variable measured by six items; distributional justice latent variable measured by four 
items; and interactional justice latent variable were measured by five items. 
Tabel 4: Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Items 
  
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
 
PRC6 <--- PROCF 1.000 
    
PRC5 <--- PROCF 1.178 .223 5.276 *** 
 
PRC4 <--- PROCF 1.580 .286 5.533 *** 
 
PRC3 <--- PROCF .630 .163 3.866 *** 
 
PRC2 <--- PROCF 1.036 .204 5.070 *** 
 
PRC1 <--- PROCF .400 .203 1.966 .049 
 
DIST4 <--- DISTRF 1.000 
    
DIST3 <--- DISTRF .937 .195 4.798 *** 
 
DIST2 <--- DISTRF .466 .114 4.105 *** 
 
DIST1 <--- DISTRF .479 .125 3.817 *** 
 
INT5 <--- INTERF 1.000 
    
INT4 <--- INTERF 1.583 .615 2.575 .010 
 
INT3 <--- INTERF .887 .516 1.719 .086 
 
INT2 <--- INTERF 3.035 1.176 2.581 .010 
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Items 
  
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
 
INT1 <--- INTERF 1.205 .670 1.798 .072 
 
   Source: data processed 
 
Procedural fairness latent variable measured by seven items, the seventh item is 
significant at the level α = 0.001. Similarly, the latent variables of distributional 
justice are measured by four items. The fourth item is significant at α = 0.001. While 
latent variables of interactional justice which are measured by five items, it is found 
that there are two variables are not significant, while the first item and the third item. 
While other items are significant at α = 0.5 
 
Graph 2:  
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A latent variable of budget satisfaction and budget performance are variables 
measurement using 4 items and six items. For the budget satisfaction, the statistical 
test shows that the four items used are not significant. 
Unlike the budget satisfaction variable, which the items used are not significant, 
the variable of budget performance the most items are significant. Only the first item 
that seems not significant, while other items seem significant at α = 0.05 
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Tabel 5: Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Items 
  
Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
 
Budget 
Satisfaction 
<--- PROCF 1.312 .255 5.146 *** 
 
Performance <--- Budget Satisfaction .346 .118 2.927 .003 
 
PRC6 <--- PROCF 1.000 
    
PRC5 <--- PROCF 1.189 .225 5.293 *** 
 
PRC4 <--- PROCF 1.673 .290 5.773 *** 
 
PRC3 <--- PROCF .674 .166 4.053 *** 
 
PRC2 <--- PROCF 1.118 .209 5.340 *** 
 
DIST4 <--- Distributional Fairness 1.000 
    
DIST3 <--- Distributional Fairness .958 .203 4.713 *** 
 
DIST2 <--- Distributional Fairness .481 .118 4.078 *** 
 
DIST1 <--- Distributional Fairness .496 .130 3.810 *** 
 
INT5 <--- INTERF 1.000 
    
INT2 <--- INTERF 3.616 1.647 2.195 .028 
 
BS4 <--- Budget Satisfaction 1.000 
    
BS3 <--- Budget Satisfaction .380 .111 3.413 *** 
 
BS2 <--- Budget Satisfaction .473 .107 4.437 *** 
 
BS1 <--- Budget Satisfaction .632 .124 5.096 *** 
 
PERF1 <--- Performance 1.000 
    
PERF3 <--- Performance 1.523 .549 2.772 .006 
 
PERF4 <--- Performance 1.837 .625 2.936 .003 
 
PERF5 <--- Performance 2.477 .807 3.068 .002 
 
PERF6 <--- Performance 2.018 .695 2.905 .004 
 
INT4 <--- INTERF 1.910 .862 2.215 .027 
 
Source: data processed 
Using the simulation measurement for the overall relationship, they are also 
tested for the goodness of fit. This simultaneous testing not only tests the loading 
factor between items with latent variables, but also the covariance between latent 
variables. The results (can be seen in table 7) shows that the overall item used validly 
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and a significant influence on the latent variables. 
Participation latent variables measured by ten items, there are two items that are 
not significant, while the eight other variables are significant at α = 0.001, while items 
3 and 7 significant at α = 0.05. Participation latent variables measured by seven items, 
it seems all is significant at α = 0.001. Variable interactional justice there are only two 
significant items, and both are significant at α = 0.001. Performance variables 
measured by six items, it seems all significant at α = 0.05 level there are only two 
items that are significant at the level α = 0.001. 
As explorative testing as has been done in order to see the extent to which each 
variable is measured by the indicators. It is found that there are not all indicators 
really significant measure the latent variable. So that the Goodness of Fit-testing was 
not yet demonstrated an ideal concept of budget participation. The model proposed 
that the  equal to 2,052 with a significance level of p = 0.000; GFI = 0.925 and 
RAMSEA = 0.08. 
 
8. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSIONS 
Statistical tests can take the following conclusion: that the relationship of 
participation with the budget performance has been using the measurements that have 
been proven validity. However, in the measurement of budgetary justice seems not 
reliable. Justice budget scrutinized by Maiga (2005) just describe two types of justice 
budgets that procedural fairness and distributional justice. While Staley et.al. (2007) 
used three concepts of justice that are added interactional justice. This shows that still 
needs to be done exploratory analysis in establishing measuring the interactional 
justice. 
In his research Maiga (2005) claimed that the measurement of latent variables 
still not be reliable because the construct has not met the adequacy measurements. 
Therefore, further research can be explored the items that reliably to be to measure the 
latent variables 
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APPENDIX  
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 47 426.492 184 .000 2.318 
Saturated model 231 .000 0 
  
Independence model 21 943.161 210 .000 4.491 
RMR, GFI 
Model RMR GFI AGFI PGFI 
Default model .080 .925 .655 .577 
Saturated model .000 1.000 
  
Independence model .197 .391 .330 .356 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model .080 .096 .124 .000 
Independence model .079 .167 .191 .000 
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